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Pretrial Discovery in Minnesota
Richard B. Allyn*
Until recently the use of discovery procedures in criminal
actions was granted to the defendant only. Those supporting this
tradition argued that the fifth amendment prevents the prosecu-
tion from compelling any information from the defendant, and
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
unilateral discovery by the defendant in order to offset the state's
inherent advantage in prosecution.' These forceful constitu-
tional arguments notwithstanding, the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota recently adopted rules of criminal procedure permitting
both the prosecution and the defense to discover nonprivileged
evidence intended for use by the opposition at trial.2 This Arti-
cle analyzes prosecutorial discovery in light of the self-incrimina-
tion clause of the fifth amendment and the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, and concludes that recent interpre-
tations of these provisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States clearly support the constitutionality of the new rules.
I. PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY AND
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person . .. shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self."3  The privilege against self-incrimination originally only
protected the defendant from being compelled to make state-
ments against his own case on the witness stand,4 but in recent
years the Supreme Court has broadened the privilege,5 although
its exact scope remains in dispute. In its most recent decisions,
the Court has limited the privilege to personal communications
* Solicitor General, State of Minnesota.
1. See Katz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: The Concept of
Mutuality and the Need for Reform, 5 CRnm. L. BuL. 445 (1969).
2. In re Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, Order of the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota, 299 Minn. (unnumbered page) (1974).
3. U.S. CoNST. amend. V1 This clause has been incorporated into
the fourteenth amendment and applied to the states. Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511, 513-15 (1967); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
4. See 8 J. WIGMOaE, EvmmcN § 2263, at 378 (J. McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961); Katz, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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by the defendant that, standing alone, implicate him in criminal
conduct."
Before promulgating the new rules of criminal procedure,
the Minnesota supreme court had adopted a more expansive in-
terpretation of the privilege than the Supreme Court's, including
as privileged information "any circumstance or link in the chain
of evidence which may tend to convict. ' 7 By permitting
the prosecution to discover the defendant's case, the new rules
appear to bring Minnesota more in line with the restrictive
position taken by the United States Supreme Court. Although
proponents of a broad interpretation of the privilege claim
that any procedure requiring a defendant to provide such infor-
mation is unconstitutional,8 a more flexible approach, and that
taken in this Article, is that the fifth amendment is not violated
by limited forms of prosecutorial discovery.
In Williams v. Florida9 the Supreme Court upheld a Flor-
ida statute requiring a defendant who intends to rely on an alibi
to disclose the names of his alibi witnesses. The Court stated
that "[h]owever 'testimonial' or 'incriminating' the alibi defense
proves to be, it cannot be considered 'compelled' within the
meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments," because only
the timing of an otherwise voluntary disclosure is compelled.10
In California v. Byers'" the Court validated a statute requiring a
driver involved in an accident to notify the owner of damaged
property of his name and address, holding that such evidence,
though compelled, must itself implicate the defendant if its com-
pulsion is to be found to violate he fifth amendment. 12 And
in Schmerber v. California,1 3 a case in which the defendant had
been convicted of drunken driving, the Court held that blood
tests, even though compelled, were not protected by the fifth
amendment because they were not testimonial. 4
6. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 747 (1966).
7. State v. Gardiner, 88 Minn. 130, 139, 92 N.W. 529, 533 (1902);
accord, State v. Olson, 274 Minn. 225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966); State v.
Mason, 152 Minn. 306, 189 N.W. 452 (1922).
8. See, e.g., Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule
16, 85 HARV. L. Rav. 994, 1001-11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Pros-
ecutorial Discovery]; Comment, Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure-Expansion of Discovery, 66 J. Camn. L. & CRnm-
NoLoGY 23 (1975).
9. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
10. Id. at 84.
11. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
12. Id. at 434.
13. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
14. Id. at 765.
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Thus, the Court appears to be saying that the fifth amend-
ment privilege is violated only if (1) the government compels dis-
closure of evidence that the defendant does not plan to reveal at
trial, (2) the evidence itself is incriminating, and (3) the evidence
is testimonial. Avoidance of any one of these defects will seem-
ingly preserve the validity of a particular discovery procedure.
In the sections that follow I will elaborate on these tests and
apply them to those provisions of the new Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure relating to prosecutorial discovery.
A. Mlnm. R. Clmm. P. 9.02 (1) (1) (2) -DscovERY OF Docum:ENrs,
TANGIBLE OBJECTS, AND REPORTS
Upon request of the prosecution, without a court order, the
defendant must disclose and permit inspection and reproduction
of (1) any books, papers, documents, photographs, or tangible
objects that the defendant intends to introduce at trial,' 5 (2)
any buildings or places concerning which the defendant intends
to offer evidence at trial,'0 and (3) any results or reports of
physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or
comparisons that the defendant intends to introduce in evidence
or that have been prepared by a witness whom the defendant
intends to call at trial.'7 This rule does not compel the defend-
ant to provide information because, like the notice-of-alibi statute
involved in Williams v. Florida, it limits discovery to evidence
that he intends to introduce at the trial.'8 The decision whether
15. The defendant shall disclose and permit the prosecuting at-
torney to inspect and reproduce books, papers, documents,
photographs, and tangible objects which the defendant intends
to introduce in evidence at the trial or concerning which the de-
fendant intends to offer evidence at the trial, and shall also per-
mit the prosecuting attorney to inspect and photograph buildings
or places concerning which the defendant intends to offer evi-
dence at the trial.AftNN. R. CPnM. P. 9.02 (1) (1).
16. Id.
17. The defendant shall disclose and permit the prosecuting at-
torney to inspect and reproduce any results or reports of physi-
cal or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments and
comparisons made in connection with the particular case within
the possession or control of the defendant which he intends to
introduce in evidence at the trial or which were prepared by
a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when
the results or reports relate to his testimony.
Mn. R. ClmM. P. 9.02(1) (2).
18. Restricting discoverable evidence to that which the defendant
intends to use at trial coincides with the limitation contained in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. FED. R. Cam. P. 16 (b) (1). This
limitation also appears in the ABA STANDmARS RELATING TO DIscoVERY
AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 3.2 (Approved Draft, 1970) [hereinafter
cited as ABA STANDARDS], and the NATIONAL ADVISORY Com'N ON
19761
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to introduce the evidence remains the defendant's. 19
In Jones v. Superior Court,20 a California trial court had
required the defendant to give the prosecution the names of all
physicians subpoenaed by the defendant, all physicians who had
examined or treated certain of his injuries, and the relevant med-
ical reports and X-rays. Sustaining this action, the California su-
preme court emphasized that the d1iscovery order was limited to
matters the defendant intended to introduce at trial. Rather
than compelling the defendant to reveal or produce anything,
the court reasoned, the disclosure order merely regulated the pro-
cedure by which the defendant presented his case.21 The only
effect on the defendant was that he had to decide earlier whether
to remain silent or to reveal the information sought, and thereby
lost the element of surprise at trial. Control over the timing
of this decision was of little strategic value to the defendant,
because when such surprises occur, the prosecution is usually
granted a continuance.22  In Williams v. Florida23 the United
Cnnvmnq ST~mARDs AND GoALs § 4.9 (1973) [hereinafter cited as AD-
VIsoRY Co1nw'e STADAnD]. Each of the advisory committees agreed
that this limitation avoided both the involuntary and the incriminatory
aspects of the privilege against self-incrimination. See Proposed Amend-
ments to Federal Rules of Criminal ]Procedure for the United States
District Courts, 62 F.R.D. 271, 315 (19741); ABA ST-ADmuDs, supra, § 3.2,
Commentary; AWvisoRY Coln' N STTmAUs, supra, § 4.9, Commentary.
The supreme court's advisory committee on the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure concluded that the restriction on mandatory dis-
closure by the defendant was necessary to avoid the possibility of in-
fringing the right against self-incrimination. MmN. R. Canv. P. 9,
Comment.
19. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84 (1970).
20. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
21. Id. at 60-62, 372 P.2d at 921-22, 22 Cal Rptr. at 881-82.
22. Justice Traynor, who authored the Jones decision, has observed:
[Sluch a continuance would not nimpair the privilege against
self-incrimination or the due process requirements of a fair trial.
Likewise, nothing is lost of the privilege, and much is gained
in orderly procedure, if the defendant is required to give ad-
vance notice of the evidence he intends to offer in defense after
he has himself received pretrial discovery of the prosecution's
case. He can hardly demand pretrial discovery and still insist
on reserving his own surprises for the trial. The good coin of
discovery gains in value when it is fairly exchanged at the ap-
propriate procedural hours. Neither the privilege against self-
incrimination nor the due process requirements of a fair trial fix
the time when the prosecution has presented its evidence at the
trial as the only procedural hour at which the defendant can be
* required to make his decision whether to remain silent or to pre-
sent his defense. Surely he can be required to make that deci-
sion before trial if he is given discovery of the prosecution's case
before trial
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
228, 248-49 (1964).
23. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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States Supreme Court adopted the Jones position, concluding
that
[n] othing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant
as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State's
case before announcing the nature of his defense, any more
than it entitles him to await the jury's verdict on the State's
case-in-chief before deciding whether or not to take the stand
himself.24
Because rule 9.02 (1) limits discovery to evidence that a de-
fendant intends to introduce on his own behalf, it does not re-
quire him to incriminate himself in the constitutional sense.25
Although discoverable tangible evidence might lead the prosecu-
tion to incriminating rebuttal evidence, this risk is no greater
than that faced by a defendant when he testifies himself and
calls witnesses whose cross-examination may prove incriminat-
ing.26 Again, rule 9.02(1) affects only the timing of the defend-
ant's decision to offer certain evidence; the only real loss is the
element of surprise, which is not protected by the fifth amend-
ment.2
7
Finally, discovery under rule 9.02(1) is limited to documen-
tary evidence that is not testimonial, for rule 9.02(3) protects
any such evidence from disclosure if it contains "the opinions,
theory, or conclusions of the defendant. ' 28 In Schmerber, the
Supreme Court carefully distinguished testimonial, communica-
tive evidence from physical evidence, such as fingerprints, pho-
tographs, measurements, handwriting, and gestures.2 9 In Couch
v. United States30 the Court reiterated the familiar notion that
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is an "inti-
mate and personal one,"3 1 which adheres to communications by
the person and not to incriminating information possessed by
others.32 And, most recently, in United States v. Nobles 33 the
24. Id. at 85.
25. See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal
Rptr. 879 (1962) ; cf. Prosecutorial Discovery, supra note 8, at 1004.
26. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83-86 (1970); cf. Prosecu-
torial Discovery, supra note 8, at 1004.
27. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970).
28. Unless otherwise provided by these rules, legal research,
records, correspondence, reports or memoranda to the extent
they contain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the defend-
ant or his counsel or persons participating in the defense are not
subject to disclosure.
Mnqi . R. Cmm. P. 9.02(3).
29. 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
30. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
31. Id. at 327.
32. Id. at 328-29.
33. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
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Court further refined the scope of the testimonial privilege in
emphasizing that by merely obtaining statements on his own
behalf the defendant cannot convert information possessed by
others into his personal communications.3 4 These cases provide
ample authority for the discovery of statements by defense wit-
nesses and reports prepared by third persons in anticipation of
testifying. Only the defendant's personal communications are
constitutionally protected, and Minmesota has ensured the neces-
sary protection in rule 9.02(3).
B. MIN. R. CRivm. P. 9.02(1) (3) (a) (3)-NOTICE OF DEFENSES
AND DEFENSE WTNESSES
Upon request of the prosecution, without a court order,
the defendant must disclose in writing any defense, other
than not guilty, that he intends to assert at trial.3r Defenses
included are alibi,36 self-defense, entrapment, mental illness or
deficiency, 37 duress, double jeopardy, statute of limitations, col-
lateral estoppel, intoxication,38 and the multiple offense rule.39
34. Id. at 233-34.
35. The defendant shall inform the prosecuting attorney in
writing of any defense, other than that of not guilty, on which
the defendant intends to rely at the trial, including but not lim-
ited to the defense of self-defense, entrapment, mental illness or
deficiency, duress, alibi, double jeopardy, statute of limitations,
collateral estoppel, defense under Minn. Stat. § 609.035, or intoxi-
cation. The defendant shall supply the prosecuting attorney
with the names and addresses of persons whom the defendant
intends to call as witnesses at the trial.
If the defendant gives notice that he intends to rely on the
defense of mental illness or mental deficiency he shall also no-
tify the prosecuting attorney whetlher he also intends to rely on
the defense of not guilty.
MViN. R. CRIm. P. 9.02(1) (3) (a).
36. If he intends to rely on an alibi defense, the defendant must
disclose the specific place where he claims he was when the crime was
committed:
If the defendant intends to offer evidence of an alibi, the de-
fendant shall also inform the prosecuting attorney of the spe-
cific place or places where the defendant contends he was when
the alleged offense occurred and shall inform the prosecuting
attorney of the names and addresses of the witnesses he intends
to call at the trial in support of the alibi.
MnT. R. CRIM. P. 9.02(1) (3) (c).
37. If the defendant intends to assert the defense of mental illness
or deficiency, he must disclose to the prosecution whether he also plans
to rely on the defense of not guilty. Id. 9.02(1) (3) (a).
38. Id., quoted in note 35 supra.
39. Except as provided in section 609.585, if a person's conduct
constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state
he may be punished for only one of such offenses and a convic-
tion or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for
any other of them. All such offenses may be included in one
MINNESOTA RULES
The defendant must also disclose the names and addresses of
persons he intends to call as witnesses at trial,40 although he is
not required to indicate those he intends to use for each specific
defense except in the case of an alibi.41
Application of the fifth amendment tests to prosecutorial
discovery of defenses and defense witnesses reveals that while
these matters may be "testimonial" they are neither "com-
pelled" nor "incriminatory." Rule 9.02 limits the disclosure of
defenses and witnesses to those the defendant intends to present
at trial. Such a procedure was sanctioned in Williams,4 2 where
the Supreme Court held that prosecutorial discovery of a de-
fendant's alibi defense-the place where he claims to have been
and the names and addresses of the alibi witnesses-was not
"compelled" under the fifth amendment. 43
Because a defendant is required to disclose only the de-
fenses and witnesses he intends to introduce on his own behalf,
rule 9.02 also excludes self-incriminating evidence.44 Again, while
it is true that discovery of a defendant's defenses and witnesses
might better prepare the prosecution for rebuttal at trial, under
past practice a continuance followed by an investigation ac-
complished the same thing.45 Nothing in rule 9.02 increases the
danger to a defendant that his own defenses or witnesses might
incriminate him.
The production of a list of defenses and witnesses, however,
usually results from communications between a defendant and
either his attorney or the prosecutor. Thus, unlike blood tests,
for example, this evidence originates in the perception and cog-
prosecution which shall be stated in separate counts.
Mnix. STAT. § 609.035 (1974).
40. 1vInwi. R. Csm. P. 9.02(1) (3) (a).
41. Id., Comment. Disclosure of defenses and witnesses as provided
by rule 9.02(1) (3) is recommended in the approved ABA Standards re-
garding prosecutorial discovery, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 18, § 3.3,
and is consistent with the recent amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1, 12.2, 16 (b) (1) (C),
62 F.R.D. 271, 292-93, 295, 306 (1974). See also NATIONAL ADvisoRy
COmm'IN, supra note 18, § 4.9. Presumably the Supreme Court would
not have adopted rules permitting discovery of certain defenses and de-
fense witnesses if it felt there was a fifth amendment problem.
42. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
43. Accord, Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919,
22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
44. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
45. For a discussion of use of the continuance to avoid surprise,
see Prosecutorial Discovery, supra note 8, at 1010.
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nitive processes of the defendant. Therefore, it may for consti-
tutional purposes be viewed as testimonial.46  On the other
hand, the Court noted in Williams that "[i] t might also be argued
... that the 'testimonial' disclosures protected by the Fifth
Amendment include only statements relating to the historical
facts of the crime, not statements relating solely to what a
defendant proposes to do at trial."47 In any case, since discov-
ery of these matters is neither compelled nor incriminating, the
rule does not run afoul of the fifth amendment.4
C. Mm. R. CRIM. P. 9.02(1) (311 (d) -DiscovERY OF CRImINAL
RECORD
The defense attorney must disclose his client's prior convic-
tions to the prosecution, provided 1he prosecutor reciprocates and
46. Id. at 1003. Rule 9.02(1) (3) (b) provides that on request of the
prosecution, and without leave of the court, the defendant must permit
the prosecutor to inspect and reproduce any relevant written or recorded
statements of witnesses he intends to call at trial, as well as written sum-
maries of any oral statements made to defendant's attorney or obtained
by defendant at the direction of his attorney. It seems clear that this
provision does not violate the self-incrimination clause. The discovery
of statements of witnesses is not compelled because it is limited to those
of witnesses who will be called by the defendant. See note 15
supra. Such statements would ordinarily be producible in any event
when the defendant has the witness testify. Because the statements are
those of the defendant's own witnesses, most are likely to be exculpatory,
and therefore not incriminating; those statements containing information
that might aid the prosecution still do not violate the fifth amendment
because they are made by third parties and are not, therefore, testi-
monial
47. 399 U.S. at 86 n.17.
48. Arguably, discovery of the defendant's defense and witnesses
violates his right to effective counsel guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment. Under this theory, such evidence would be regarded as an attor-
ney's work product; requiring defense counsel to divulge any portion of
it before trial might inhibit preparation of the defendant's case by mak-
ing the defendant less forthright in the presentation of his case to his
attorney. Although this argument is not wholly unappealing, it is diffi-
cult to imagine how discovery of defenses and witnesses would inhibit
attorney-client candor. The defendant's statements to his attorney are
not discoverable under the rules. Mnnm. R. Cmvr. P. 9.02(1) (3) (b),
(3). See also id. 9.03 (5) (protective order provisions). Moreover, the
attorney, not the defendant, decides who the witnesses will be and what
defenses should be raised. Since nothing the defendant relates to his
attorney is directly discoverable or necessarily inferable from the attor-
ney's choice of defenses and witnesses, the sixth amendment argument
loses much of its force.
The Supreme Court did not address the sixth amendment issue in
Williams, but in denying the fifth amendment claim, it rejected the argu-
ment that surprise merits constitutional protection. 399 U.S. at 85-86.
Since preparation of a defense is not inhibited by discovery of defenses




reveals prior convictions of the defendant known to him.4 9 This
discovery does not constitute compulsory self-incrimination. In
Minnesota, a defendant's criminal record can be used only for
impeaching his credibility; no reference may be made to it until
the defendant subjects himself to cross-examination by volun-
tarily taking the witness stand on his own behalf.50 So long
as the defendant's record may be revealed only under these cir-
cumstances, the choice remains with him, and the issue again
becomes one of timing and strategy, rather than compulsion.5
Evidence of a defendant's criminal record may nevertheless
tend to incriminate him. While such evidence is admissible only
to impeach the defendant's testimony on his own behalf and
not as direct evidence of a crime, most courts and commentators
agree that prior criminal convictions may nevertheless prejudice
his case; a jury is often unable or unwilling to treat such "char-
acter" evidence as affecting only the defendant's credibility.52
This tendency on the part of juries, however, provides no justifi-
cation for treating the rule providing for discovery of a defend-
ant's criminal record differently than the courts have in the
past-that is, as an evidentiary matter falling within the court's
discretion.5 3
Disclosure of prior convictions does not appear to involve
eliciting testimonial communications from the defendant, since
the prior conviction is contained in a public record, though
perhaps unknown to the prosecution. The disclosure is similar
to requiring a defendant to provide a fingerprint54 or a voice
sample,55 both of which may constitutionally be demanded, as
49. Defense counsel shall inform the prosecuting attorney of
any prior convictions of the defendant provided the prosecuting
attorney informs defense counsel of the record of prior convic-
tions known to the prosecuting attorneys.
At=. R. Cauv. P. 9.02(1) (3) (d).
A similar provision was contained in the proposed amendments to
the federal rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States Dis-
trict Courts, 16(a) (1) (iii), 48 F.R.D. 553, 547 (1970), but was not finally
adopted; nor is such a provision included in the ABA Standards.
50. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 291 Minn. 407, 192 N.W.2d 87 (1971);
State v. West, 285 Minn. 188, 173 N.W.2d 468 (1970).
51. Constitutional considerations aside, this provision will certainly
limit potentially prejudicial disputes in the presence of the jury as to
what a defendant's criminal record may actually be. See State v. Wil-
liams, 297 Minn. 76, 210 N.W.2d 21 (1973).
52. Id.
53. Cf. M nT. R. Civ. P. 43.02.
54. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
55. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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assumed by rule 9.02(2) (1).56
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY AND DUE PROCESS
Critics frequently argue that coupling prosecutorial discov-
ery with the state's overwhelming investigatory powers and su-
perior financial resources deprives a defendant of his liberty
without due process of law by upsetting "the balance of forces
between the accused and his accuser."57 The Supreme Court
has concluded, however, that limited prosecutorial discovery
does not offend due process as long as the defendant has the
same or similar right to discovery.511
In Williams v. Florida59 the Court held that the notice-of-
alibi requirement did not violate due process because the state
had a legitimate interest in protecting itself from eleventh hour
defenses and because the rule imposed reciprocal duties of dis-
closure on the prosecution and made other discovery devices
56. Upon a motion by the prosecution and a showing that thediscovery procedure sought "will be of material aid in determin-
ing whether the defendant committed the offense charged" the
court may order a defendant to:
(a) Appear in a lineup;(b) Speak for identification by witnesses to an offense, or
for the purpose of taking voice prints;(c) Be fingerprinted or permit, palm prints or footprints to
be taken;
(d) Permit measurements of the body to be taken;
(e) Pose for photographs not involving a re-enactment of
a scene;(f) Permit the taking of samples of his blood, hair, saliva,
urine, and other materials of his body which involve no unrea-
sonable intrusion thereof; provided, however, that the court shall
not permit a blood test to be taken except upon a showing ofprobable cause to believe that the test will aid in establishing
the guilt of the defendant;
(g) Provide specimens of his hamdwriting; and
(h) Submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection ofhis body.
mw. R. CnwR. P. 9.02(2) (1). Inasmuch as the evidence obtained by the
prosecutor under rule 9.02 (2) is not limited to material she intends to
introduce at trial and is extracted from the defendant only by virtue
of a court order, it is clearly compelled, and may prove to be incriminat-
ing. Such physical evidence, however, is not testimonial. The privilege
against self-incrimination protects the defendant's written or oral expres-
sions of thought or state of mind, but it does not protect information
obtained from his body. See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
57. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); see Goldstein, The
State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Prosecutorial Discovery, supra note 8, at 1017.
58. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973); Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970).
59. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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available to the defendant.10 The Court noted approvingly that
"the search for truth [was enhanced] by insuring both the de-
fendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain
facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.""' In
Wardius v. Oregon"2 the Court again emphasized reciprocity in
reversing a conviction because a notice-of-alibi statute failed to
require the prosecution to reveal the names and addresses of wit-
nesses it planned to use to refute the alibi defense disclosed by
the accused. 3
The discovery provisions of the Annesota Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure afford the defendant the same or similar discov-
ery rights and restrictions as the prosecution.6 While discovery
is available to both parties, neither side is deprived of discovery
because of the other's reluctance to proceed; the right of discov-
ery does not depend on the strategy of the opposing side.65
A defendant may also utilize certain procedures other than
those provided in rule 9 to discover the prosecution's case. She
may move to obtain a verbatim transcript of the testimony of
all witnesses appearing before the grand jury that issued the in-
dictment charging her.6 6 Perhaps the best additional source of
60. FLA. R. Canv. P. 3.220 provides that the defendant may discover
the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor who
may have information relevant to the offense charged, and statements
made by such persons; statements by the accused known to the prose-
cutor; statements of co-defendants known to the prosecutor; recorded
grand jury minutes containing testimony of the accused; tangible papers
or objects belonging to the accused; whether the state has information
provided by confidential informants or obtained through electronic sur-
veillance, or documents seized in relation thereto; expert reports; any
tangible papers or objects not obtained from the accused; and any other
material information that tends to negate the guilt of the accused.
61. 339 U.S. at 82.
62. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
63. Id. at 475.
64. Rule 9.01 provides that the prosecution must disclose the names
and addresses of witnesses it intends to call at trial together with their
prior record of convictions; statements obtained from the defendant and
his accomplices; documents and tangible objects that were obtained from
the defendant or that the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial; reports
of examinations and tests; prior convictions of the defendant known to
the prosecutor; and any exculpatory information in the prosecutor's pos-
session.
65. The sole exception to this principle of independence is that the
defendant need not disclose his prior criminal record unless the prosecu-
tor reciprocates. MiNN. R. Cmm. P. 9.02(1) (3) (d), quoted in note 49
supra. Compare ABA STAmARDs, supra note 18, §§ 3.1, 30.2, 3.3 with
FED. R. CRm. P. 16(c) (prosecutorial discovery dependent on defendant
first obtaining discovery). The ABA Standards, like FED. R. CRIM. P.
16, impose no such restriction.
66. AlwN. R. Camw. P. 18.05.
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discovery for the defendant is the omnibus hearing provided for
by rule 11. 67 At this hearing, the prosecution must offer evi-
dence sufficient to establish probable cause 8 to believe that the
defendant committed the crime charged and must defend the con-
stitutionality of the means by which the evidence against the
defendant was obtained. 69 The prosecution must also notify the
defendant of any additional offenses it intends to urge at the
trial.7 0
Since the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure make sub-
stantial discovery procedures available to defendants, consistent
with the Supreme Court's holdings in Williams and Wardius, the
limited prosecutorial discovery procedures do not violate due
process of law under the fourteenth amendment.
III. CONCLUISION
It appears reasonably clear that rule 9 does not violate either
the fifth or the fourteenth amendments. Moreover, emphasis on
its constitutionality tends to divert attention from the significant
practical advantages of criminal discovery that serve the inter-
ests of both the defendant and the prosecution. Discovery
avoids surprise, discourages false defenses, and aids in the detec-
tion of perjury by witnesses. More importantly, discovery
saves time and expense in criminal proceedings. Reciprocal dis-
covery, if used to its fullest extent, will encourage negotiated
67. Id. 11.02, .04.
68. Recent interpretations of the omnibus hearing provisions, how-
ever, leave the probable cause requirement in doubt. See, e.g., State v.
Florence, 239 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1976). For a discussion of the Min-
nesota supreme court's recent treatment of the probable cause hear-
ing, see Comment, The Probable Cause Hearing in Minnesota, 60 MiTNN.
L. REV. 773 (1976).
69. Evidence subject to constitutional challenge includes:
(1) any evidence against the defendant obtained as a result of
a search, search and seizure, wiretapping, or any form of elec-
tronic or mechanical eavesdropping; (2) any confessions, admis-
sions or statements in the nature of confessions made by the de-
fendant; (3) any evidence against the defendant discovered as
the result of confessions, admissions or statements in the nature
of confessions made by the defendant; or (4) any identification
procedures that were followed, including but not limited to line-
ups or other observations of the defendant and the exhibition
of photographs of the defendant or of any other persons.
MiNu. R. CmnA. P. 7.01.
70. Id. 7.02. Notwithstanding the balance of discovery procedures,
it of course remains true that the prosecution carries the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may remain silent throughout
-his trial, and the jury must convict unanimously. Mmnr. R. Cmn. P.




pleas or dismissals and avoid lengthy trials much in the same
way discovery in civil actions avoids the expense of unnecessary
litigation. Nevertheless, some defense counsel are currently
declining to comply with rule 9, arguing that they do not want
to be confined to defend only with evidence they have disclosed
to the prosecution. These attorneys claim that they cannot antic-
ipate what rebuttal evidence will be necessary until they've
heard the prosecution's entire case. Although occasionally prose-
cution evidence presented during trial may prompt the defense
to add or delete witnesses and exhibits, this argument is unsup-
portable when asserted by the defendant to avoid disclosing a
defense of alibi, mental illness, self-defense, or any other affirma-
tive defense, or to avoid disclosing the identity of his probable
witnesses. To ensure that the advantages of discovery accrue
from the rules, trial courts should require defense counsel to
abide by both the spirit and the letter of rule 9. The rule permits
a defendant to add or eliminate witnesses when genuinely sur-
prised during trial; but if the defendant has fully availed himself
of pretrial discovery, he will have sufficient information both to
construct his defense and to make full and suitable disclosure
to the prosecution.
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